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Verification of Uncertain POMDPs Using Barrier Certificates
Mohamadreza Ahmadi, Murat Cubuktepe, Nils Jansen, and Ufuk Topcu
Abstract— We consider a class of partially observable
Markov decision processes (POMDPs) with uncertain transition
and/or observation probabilities. The uncertainty takes the
form of probability intervals. Such uncertain POMDPs can be
used, for example, to model autonomous agents with sensors
with limited accuracy, or undergoing a sudden component
failure, or structural damage [1]. Given an uncertain POMDP
representation of the autonomous agent, our goal is to propose
a method for checking whether the system will satisfy an
optimal performance, while not violating a safety requirement
(e.g. fuel level, velocity, and etc.). To this end, we cast the
POMDP problem into a switched system scenario. We then
take advantage of this switched system characterization and
propose a method based on barrier certificates for optimality
and/or safety verification. We then show that the verification
task can be carried out computationally by sum-of-squares
programming. We illustrate the efficacy of our method by
applying it to a Mars rover exploration example.
I. INTRODUCTION
A popular formal model for planning subject to stochastic
behavior are Markov decision processes (MDPs) [2], where
an agent chooses to perform an action under full knowledge
of the environment it is operating in. The outcome of the ac-
tion is a probability distribution over the system states. Many
applications, however, allow only partial observability of the
current system state [3], [4], [5]. Partially observable Markov
decision processes (POMDPs) extend MDPs to account for
such partial information [6]. Upon certain observations, the
agent infers the likelihood of the system being in a certain
state, called the belief state. The belief state together with an
update function form a (typically uncountably infinite) MDP,
referred to as the belief MDP [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].
Most formulations assume the the transition probabil-
ity function and the observation function for MDPs and
POMDPs are explicitly given. Unforeseeable events such as
(unpredictable) structural damage to a system [12] or an
imprecise sensor model [13], however, necessitate a more
robust formalism. So-called uncertain MDPs incorporate
uncertainty-sets of probabilities, for instance, for models
that are empirically determined. Similar extensions exist for
uncertain POMDPs [14], [15], [16].
Here, we aim to address current challenges for the area of
artificial intelligence, referred to as robust decision-making
and safe exploration [17], [18], [19], [20]. Concretely, the
problem is to provide a policy for an (autonomous) agent
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that ensures certain desired behavior by robustly accounting
for any uncertainty and partial observability that may occur
in the system [21]. The policy should be optimal with respect
to some performance measure and additionally ensure safe
navigation through the environment.
However, already for mere POMDPs (without uncertain-
ties in the probabilities), such policies are computed by
assessing the entire belief MDP, rendering the problem un-
decidable [22]. Several promising approximate point-based
methods via finite abstraction of the belief space are proposed
in the literature [23], [24], [25]. Nonetheless, these tech-
niques do not provide a guarantee for safety or optimality.
That is, it is not clear whether the probability of satisfying
the safety/optimality requirement is an upper-bound or a
lower-bound for a given POMDP. Establishing guaranteed
performance is of fundamental importance in safety-critical
applications, e.g. aircraft collision avoidance [26] and Mars
rovers [27].
In this paper, we borrow a notion from control theory to
provide guarantees for optimality and safety of uncertain
POMDPs, without the need for finite abstraction. We first
demonstrate that POMDP analysis problems can be repre-
sented as analyzing the solutions of a special discrete-time
switched systems [28]. In particular, POMDPs with uncer-
tain transition and/or observation probabilities belonging to
intervals can be characterized as a class of switched systems
with parametric uncertainty. Based on this switched system
representation, we verify the safety and/or optimality re-
quirements of a given POMDP using barrier certificates [29]
(see our preliminary results with application to privacy
verification of POMDPs [30]). We show that if there exist
a barrier certificate satisfying a set of inequalities along the
belief update equation of the POMDP, the safety/optimality
property is guaranteed to hold. These conditions can be
computationally implemented as a set of sum-of-squares
programs (see Appendix A for a brief introduction). We
elucidate the proposed method by applying it to an uncertain
POMDP model for a Mars rover with uncertain sensor
accuracy sampling rocks on the Mars terrain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
subsequent section, we define the notations used in this paper
and review some preliminary definitions. In Section III, we
describe the class of uncertainties and the properties that
we are interested in. In Section IV, we propose a switched
system representation for POMDPs, and present conditions
based on barrier certificates for checking optimality and/or
safety. In Section V, we apply the proposed method to verify
the performance of an uncertain POMDP model of a Mars
rover sampling rocks. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude
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the paper and give directions for future research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notation: The notations employed in this paper are rela-
tively straightforward. R≥0 denotes the set [0,∞). Z denotes
the set of integers and Z≥c for c ∈ Z implies the set
{c, c+1, c+2, . . .}. R[x] accounts for the set of polynomial
functions with real coefficients in x ∈ Rn, p : Rn → R
and Σ ⊂ R is the subset of polynomials with a sum-of-
squares decomposition; i.e, p ∈ Σ[x] if and only if there are
pi ∈ R[x], i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that p = p2i + · · ·+ p2k. For
a finite set A, |A| denotes the number of elements in A.
A. Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
Markov decision processes (MDPs) [2] are decision-
making modeling framework, in which the actions have
stochastic outcomes. An MDP M = (Q, p0, A, T ) has the
following components:
• Q is a finite set of states with indices {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• p0 : Q → [0, 1] defines the distribution of the initial
states, i.e., p0(q) denotes the probability of starting at
q ∈ Q.
• A is a finite set of actions.
• T : Q × A × Q → [0, 1] is the probabilistic transition
function, where
T (q, a, q′) := P (qt = q′|qt−1 = q, at−1 = a),
∀t ∈ Z≥1, q, q′ ∈ Q, a ∈ A.
POMDPs provide a more general mathematical framework
to consider not only the stochastic outcomes of actions,
but also the imperfect state observations [31]. Formally,
a POMDP P = (Q, p0, A, T, Z,O) is defined with the
following components:
• Q, p0, A, T are the same as the definition of an MDP.
• Z is the set of all possible observations representing
outputs of a discrete sensor. Usually z ∈ Z is an
incomplete projection of the world state q, contaminated
by sensor noise.
• O : Q × A × Z → [0, 1] is the observation probability
transition function (sensor model), where
O(q, a, z) := P (zt = z|qt = q, at−1 = a),
∀t ∈ Z≥1, q ∈ Q, a ∈ A, z ∈ Z.
Since the states are not directly accessible in a POMDP,
decision making requires the history of observations. There-
fore, we need to define the notion of a belief or the posterior
as sufficient statistics for the history [32]. Given a POMDP,
the belief at t = 0 is defined as b0(q) = p0(q) and bt(q)
denotes the probability of system being in state q at time t.
At time t + 1, when action a ∈ A is observed, the belief
update can be obtained by a Bayesian filter as
bt(q
′) = P (q′|zt, at−1, bt−1)
=
P (zt|q′, at−1, bt−1)P (q′|at−1, bt−1)
P (zt|at−1, bt−1)
=
P (zt|q′, at−1, bt−1)
P (zt|at−1, bt−1)
×
∑
q∈Q
P (q′|at−1, bt−1, q)P (q|at−1, bt−1)
=
O(q′, at−1, zt)
∑
q∈Q T (q, at−1, q
′)bt−1(q)∑
q′∈QO(q′, at−1, zt)
∑
q∈Q T (q, at−1, q′)bt−1(q)
,
(1)
where the beliefs belong to the belief unit simplex
B =
{
b ∈ [0, 1]|Q| |
∑
q
bt(q) = 1,∀t
}
.
A policy in a POMDP setting is then a mapping pi : B →
A, i.e., a mapping from the continuous beliefs space into the
discrete and finite action space.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We represent the uncertainty in the autonomous agent’s
dynamics as a POMDP with uncertain transition and/or
observation probabilities. The class of uncertainties we study
belong to an interval [33]. Let Tu denote the set of triplets
(q, a, q′) corresponding to the uncertain transition probabil-
ities. Similarly, let Ou denote the set of triplets (q, a, z)
corresponding to the uncertain observation probabilities. We
consider the class of POMDPs with the following interval
transition and/or observation probabilities
T (q, a, q′) ∈ [lq,a,q′ , lq,a,q′ ], (q, a, q′) ∈ Tu, (2a)
O(q, a, z) ∈ [oq,a,z, oq,a,z], (q, a, z) ∈ Ou, (2b)
where the constants 0 ≤ lq,a,q′ ≤ lq,a,q′ ≤ 1 for all
(q, a, q′) ∈ Tu and 0 ≤ oq,a,z ≤ oq,a,z ≤ 1 for all
(q, a, z) ∈ Ou.
In the sequel, we focus on the case of uncertain transition
probabilities, but the extension to the case of uncertain
observation transition probabilities is straightforward and
follows the same lines.
A. Safety and Optimality
For typical POMDP problems, we are often interested in
assessing both optimal and safe behavior. In the following,
we define the formal notions of optimality and safety we
consider here.
We define safety as the probability of reaching a set of
unsafe states Qu ⊂ Q being less than a given constant. To
this end, we use the belief states. Formally, we are interested
in solving the following problem.
Problem 1: Given an uncertain POMDP with interval
probabilities as described in (2), a point future in time t∗, a
set of unsafe states Qu, and a safety requirement constant λ,
check whether
g (bt∗(q)) ≤ λ, q ∈ Qu, (3)
where g : B → R. In particular, g can be an affine function.
In addition to safety, we are interested in checking whether
an optimality criterion is satisfied.
Problem 2: Given an uncertain POMDP with interval
probabilities as described in (2), the reward function R :
Q×A→ R, in which R(q, a) denotes the reward of taking
action a while being at state q, a point future in time t∗, and
a optimality requirement γ, check whether
t∗∑
s=0
r(bs, as) ≤ γ, (4)
where r(bs, as) =
∑
q∈Q btR(q, at).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Checking whether (3) and (4) hold by solving the POMDP
directly is a PSPACE-hard problem [22], not to mention
the difficulties arising from uncertain transition probabilities.
In this section, we first demonstrate that POMDPs can be
represented as discrete-time switched systems. Then, we
borrow a notion from control theory to check the safety
and/or optimality requirements of a given POMDP with a
guarantee or a certificate.
A. Treating POMDPs as Switched Systems
The belief update equation (1) is a discrete-time switched
system, where the actions a ∈ A define the switching modes.
Formally, the belief dynamics (1) can be described as
bt = fa (bt−1, zt) , (5)
where b denote the belief vector belonging to the belief
unit simplex B and b0 ∈ B0 ⊂ B representing the set
of initial beliefs (prior). In (6), a ∈ A denote the actions
that can be interpreted as the switching modes, z ∈ Z are
the observations representing inputs, and t ∈ Z≥1 denote
the discrete time instances. The vector fields {fa}a∈A with
fa : [0, 1]
|Q| → [0, 1]|Q| are described as the vectors with
rows
fq
′
a (b, ·, z) =
O(q′, a, z)
∑
q∈Q T (q, a, q
′)bt−1(q)∑
q′∈QO(q′, a, z)
∑
q∈Q, T (q, a, q′)bt−1(q)
,
where fq
′
a denotes the q
′th row of fa. If the transition
probabilities are uncertain, i.e., they belong to some given
set, the system can be represented as an uncertain discrete-
time switched system
bt = fa (bt−1, θ, zt) , (6)
where θ ∈ Θ is a set of uncertain parameters and Θ
represents the uncertain transition probability intervals (2).
That is,
θq,a,q′ = T (q, a, q
′) ∈ [lq,a,q′ , lq,a,q′ ], (q, a, q′) ∈ Tu,
and
Θ =
{
θ | θq,a,q′ ∈ [lq,a,q′ , lq,a,q′ ], (q, a, q′) ∈ Tu
}
. (7)
In this study, we consider two classes of problems in
POMDP verification:
Fig. 1: An example of a POMDP with two states and the
state-dependent switching modes induced by the policy (8).
1. No policy is given: This case corresponds to analyz-
ing (6) under arbitrary switching with switching modes
given by a ∈ A.
2. A policy is given: This corresponds to to analyzing (6)
under state-dependent switching. Indeed, the policy pi :
B → A determines regions in the belief space where
each mode (action) is active.
Both cases of switched systems with arbitrary switching
and state-dependent switching are well-known in the systems
and controls literature [28]. The next example illustrates the
proposed switched system representation for POMDPs with
a given policy.
Example 1: Consider a POMDP with two states {q1, q2},
two actions {a1, a2}, and z ∈ Z. The policy
pi =
{
a1, b ∈ B1,
a2, b ∈ B2 (8)
leads to different switching modes based on whether the
states belong to the regions B1 or B2 (see Figure 1). That is,
the belief update equation (6) is given by
bt =
{
fa1 (bt−1, zt) , b ∈ B1,
fa2 (bt−1, zt) , b ∈ B2. (9)
Note that the belief space is given by B = B1 ∪ B2 = {b |
b(q1) + b(q2) = 1}.
B. Verification Using Barrier Certificates
In the following, we show how we can use barrier certifi-
cates to verify properties of the switched systems induced
by POMDPS.
Let us define the following unsafe set
Bsu = {b ∈ B | g (bt∗(q)) > λ, q ∈ Qu}, (10)
which is the complement of (3).
Theorem 1: Consider the belief update equation (6) and
the uncertain transition probabilities (7). Given a set of initial
beliefs B0 ⊂ [0, 1]|Q|, an unsafe set Bsu as given in (10)
(B0 ∩ Bsu = ∅), and a constant t∗, if there exists a function
B : Z× B → R called the barrier certificate such that
B(t∗, bt∗) > 0, ∀bt∗ ∈ Bsu, (11)
B(0, b0) < 0, ∀b0 ∈ B0, (12)
and
B (t, fa(bt−1, θ, z))−B(t− 1, bt−1) ≤ 0,
∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t∗},
∀a ∈ A, ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀z ∈ Z, ∀b ∈ B, (13)
then there exist no solution of the belief update equation (6)
such that b0 ∈ B0, and bt∗ ∈ Bu for all a ∈ A and all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof: The proof is carried out by contradiction.
Assume at time instance t∗ there exist a solution to (6) such
that b0 ∈ B0 and bt∗ ∈ Bsu. From inequality (13), we have
B(t, bt) ≤ B(t− 1, bt−1)
for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t∗}, all actions a ∈ A, and θ ∈ Θ.
Hence, B(t, bt) ≤ B(0, b0) for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t∗}.
Furthermore, inequality (12) implies that
B(0, b0) < 0
for all b0 ∈ B0. Since the choice of t∗ can be arbitrary,
this is a contradiction because it implies that B(t∗, bt∗) ≤
B(0, b0) < 0. Therefore, there exist no solution of (6) such
that b0 ∈ B0 and bt∗ ∈ Bsu for any sequence of actions a ∈ A
and uncertain probabilities belonging to Θ. Therefore, the
safety requirement is satisfied.
The above theorem provides conditions under which the
POMDP is guaranteed to be safe. The next result brings
forward a set of conditions, which verifies whether the
optimality criterion (4) is satisfied.
Corollary 1: Consider the belief update equation (6), the
uncertain probabilities (7) and the optimality criterion γ as
given by (4). Let γ˜ : Z≥0 → R satisfying
t∗∑
s=0
γ˜(s) ≤ γ. (14)
Given a set of initial beliefs B0 ⊂ B, an unsafe set
Bou = {(t, b) | r(bt, at) > γ(t)} , (15)
and a constant t∗, if there exists a function B : Z× B → R
such that (11)-(13) are satisfied with Bou instead of Bsu, then
for all b0 ∈ B0 the optimality criterion (4) holds.
Proof: The proof is straightforward and an application
of Theorem 1. If conditions (11)-(13) are satisfied with Bou
instead of Bsu, based on Theorem 1, we conclude that there
exist no solution of the belief update equation (6) such that
b0 ∈ B0, and bt∗ ∈ Bou for all a ∈ A and all θ ∈ Θ.
Therefore, we have
r(bt, at) ≤ γ˜(t), ∀t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t∗}.
Summing up both sides of the above equation from t = 0 to
t = t∗ yields
t∗∑
s=0
r(bs, as) ≤
t∗∑
s=0
γ˜(s).
Then, from (14), we conclude that
∑t∗
s=0 r(bs, as) ≤ γ.
Fig. 2: Two methods for ensuring both safety and optimality.
The zero-level sets of Bs (Bo) separate the evolutions of the
beliefs starting at B0 from Bsu (Bou). The red line illustrates
the zero-level sets of the barrier certificate formed by taking
the maximum of Bs and B0. The blue line illustrate the
zero-level set of the barrier certificate formed by taking the
convex hull of Bs and B0.
The technique used in Corollary 1 is analogous to the one
used in [34], [35] for bounding (time-averaged) functional
outputs of systems described by partial differential equations.
The method proposed here, however, can be used for a large
class of discrete time systems and the belief update equation
is a special case that is of our interest.
In practice, it is often desirable to make sure a design
is both optimal and safe. The problem can be described by
checking whether the solutions of the belief update switched
dynamics (6) enter the following set
Bu = Bsu ∪ Bou.
To this end, we can adopt either of the following approaches
(see Figure 2). Both of these approaches are based on the
construction of non-smooth barrier certificates. The first one,
proposed in [36], suggests finding the barrier certificate for
Bsu and Bou separately or in parallel. The barrier certificate for
the set Bu is then the maximum of the two certificates, i.e.,
B = max{Bs, Bo}, where Bs is the barrier certificate for
checking safety and Bo is the barrier certificate for checking
optimality. The second method proposed by the authors
in [37], [38] suggests searching for a barrier certificate
composed of the convex hull of the Bs and Bo. In this paper,
we adopt the latter method.
C. Computational Method based on
Sum-of-Squares Programming
The belief update equation (1) is a rational function in the
belief states bt(q), q ∈ Qs
bt(q
′) =
Sa (bt−1(q′), θ, zt−1)
Ra (bt−1(q′), θ, zt−1)
=
O(q′, at−1, zt)
∑
q∈Q T (q, at−1, q
′)bt−1(q)∑
q′∈QO(q′, at−1, zt)
∑
q∈Q T (q, at−1, q′)bt−1(q)
.
(16)
The uncertain probabilities T (q, at−1, q′) are parameters that
belong to the set (7). Moreover, the unsafe set (10) and the
uncertainty set (7) are semi-algebraic sets, since they can be
described by polynomial inequalities. We further assume the
set of initial beliefs is also given by a semi-algebraic set as
follows
B0 =
{
b0 ∈ R|Qs| | l0i (b0) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n0
}
, (17)
and g ∈ R[b] as in (3).
At this stage, we are ready to present conditions based on
sum-of-squares programs to verify safety of a given uncertain
POMDP.
Corollary 2: Consider the POMDP belief update dynam-
ics (16), the unsafe set (10), the set of uncertain proba-
bilities (7), the set of initial beliefs (17), and a constant
t∗ > 0. If there exist polynomial functions B ∈ R[t, b] of
degree d, puq ∈ Σ[b], q ∈ Qu, p0i ∈ Σ[b], i = 1, 2, . . . , n0,
pθq,a,q′ ∈ Σ[b, θ], (q, a, q′) ∈ Tu, and constants s1, s2 > 0
such that
B (t∗, bt∗) +
∑
q∈Qu
puq (bt∗) (g (bt∗(q))− λ)− s1 ∈ Σ [bt∗ ] ,
(18)
−B (0, b0) +
n0∑
i=1
p0i (b0)l
0
i (b0)− s2 ∈ Σ [b0] , (19)
and
−Ra (bt−1)d
(
B
(
t,
Sa (bt−1, θ, z)
Ra (bt−1, θ, z)
)
−B(t− 1, bt−1)
−
∑
(q,a,q′)∈Tu
pθq,a,q′(θ, bt−1)(lq,a,q′−θq,a,q′)(lq,a,q′−θq,a,q′)
)
∈ Σ[t, bt−1, θ],∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t∗}, z ∈ Z, a ∈ A, (20)
then there exists no b0 ∈ B0 such that bt∗ ∈ Bu.
Proof: Sum-of-squares conditions (18) and (19) are
a direct consequence of applying Propositions 1 and 2 in
Appendix A to verify conditions (11) and (12), respectively.
Furthermore, condition (13) for system (16) can be re-
written as
B
(
t,
Sa (bt−1, θ, z)
Ra (bt−1, θ, z)
)
−B(t− 1, bt−1) > 0,
∀a ∈ A, ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀z ∈ Z.
Since θ ∈ Θ is a semi-algebraic set, we use Propositions 1
and 2 in Appendix A to obtain
B
(
t,
Sa (bt−1, θ, z)
Ra (bt−1, θ, z)
)
−B(t− 1, bt−1)
−
∑
(q,a,q′)∈Tu
pθq,a,q′(θ, bt−1)(lq,a,q′−θq,a,q′)(lq,a,q′−θq,a,q′)
∈ Σ[t, bt−1, θ],∀a ∈ A, ∀z ∈ Z.
for pθq,a,q′ ∈ Σ[b, θ], (q, a, q′) ∈ Tu. Given that
Ra (bt−1(q′), θ, z) is a positive polynomial of degree one,
we can relax the above inequality into a sum-of-squares
condition given by
−Ra (bt−1, θ, z)d
(
B
(
t,
Sa (bt−1, θ, z)
Ra (bt−1, θ, z)
)
−B (t− 1, bt−1)
−
∑
(q,a,q′)∈Tu
pθq,a,q′(θ, bt−1)(lq,a,q′−θq,a,q′)(lq,a,q′−θq,a,q′)
)
∈ Σ[t, bt−1, θ].
Hence, if (20) holds, then (13) is satisfied as well. From
Theorem 1, we infer that there is no bt(q) at time t∗ such
that b0(q) ∈ B0 and g (bt∗(q)) > λ. Equivalently, the safety
requirement is satisfied at time t∗. That is, g (bt∗(q)) ≤ λ.
Checking whether optimality holds can also be cast into
sum-of-squares programs. To this end, we assume the reward
function is a polynomial (or can be approximated by a
polynomial1) in beliefs , i.e., R ∈ R[b].
The following Corollary can be derived using similar
arguments as the proof of Corollary 2.
Corollary 3: Consider the POMDP belief update dynam-
ics (16), the set of uncertain probabilities (7), the set of
initial beliefs (17), and a constant t∗ > 0. If there exist
polynomial functions γ˜ ∈ R[t] characterizing the unsafe
set (15), B ∈ R[t, b] with degree d, puq ∈ Σ[b], q ∈ Qu,
p0i ∈ Σ[b], i = 1, 2, . . . , n0, pθq,a,q′ ∈ Σ[b, θ], (q, a, q′) ∈ Tu,
and constants s1, s2 > 0 such that (14), and (18)-(20) are
satisfied, then for all b0 ∈ B0, the optimality criterion (4)
holds.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
We demonstrate the applicability of our methods on a
variant of the RockSample problem [27]. We model the
problem using the input language of the probabilistic model
checker PRISM [40]. In a Python toolchain, we employ
the model checker Storm [41] to build the explicit state
space of the examples. In order to check the sum-of-squares
conditions formulated in Section IV-C, we use diagonally-
dominant-sum-of-squares (DSOS) relaxations of the sum-of-
squares programs implemented through the Systems Poly-
nomial Optimization Toolbox (SPOT) [42] (for more details
see [43], [44]).
A. Uncertain POMDP Model for Mars Rover Exploration
A Mars rover explores a terrain, where “scientifically
valuable” rocks may be hidden. The locations of the rocks are
known, but it is unknown whether they have the type “good”
or “bad”. Once the rover moves to the immediate location
of a rock, it can sample its type. As sampling is expensive,
the rover is equipped with a noisy long-range sensor that
returns an estimate on the type of the rock. The accuracy of
the sensor decreases with the distance to the rock.
1This assumption is realistic, since the beliefs belong to a bounded set
(a unit simplex) and by Stone-Weierstrass theorem any continuous function
defined on a bounded domain can be uniformly approximated arbitrary close
by a polynomial [39].
Fig. 3: A RockSample[4, 2] instance where the initial position
of the rover and the two rock positions in the grid are known.
To the right is the goal area, and to the lower side of the grid
is a sand dune from which the rover may fall over.
Formally, RockSample[n, k] describes an instance
of the problem with the terrain being a grid
of size n × n and k rocks, which may have
one of the types RockTypei = {good , bad} for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. The rover may choose from the actions
{Up,Down,Left ,Right ,Sample,Check1 , . . . ,Checkk}.
When the rover moves off the right edge of the grid, it
reaches its goal area, where it receives a reward of 10.
Sampling of a rock yields a reward of 10 if the rock is
good , and −10 otherwise. The potentially negative reward
causes an incentive to predict the type of a rock in advance.
Executing action Checki returns a noisy observation
whether rock i is good or bad . The probability of a wrong
observation decreases with the distance to rock i. The
underlying model is a POMDP, where the positions of the
rover and the rock are observable, while the type of the
rocks is not observable unless a rock has been sampled. The
belief describe the probability of the correct rock types. To
maximize the (expected) reward, the rover aims to correctly
estimate the types in order to not sample a bad rock.
To account for the full potential of our method, we
augmented the original RockSample problem as described
above by (1) uncertainty and (2) safety considerations. First,
concrete probabilities for wrong observations using the long-
range sensor seem unrealistic when one considers that they
may be the result of simulations and statistical inference of a
probabilistic sensor model. Therefore, we introduce interval
uncertainties. For instance, if from a certain distance there
is a probability of 0.5 for a faulty observation, we may
assume that this probability lies within the interval [0.5, 0.6]
to account for even worse accuracy of the sensor. A policy
that maximizes the reward for the rover should then be robust
against the uncertainties.
deg(B) 1 2 3
λ 0.12 0.29 0.57 for t
∗ = 10.
deg(B) 1 2 3
λ 0.31 0.44 0.73 for t
∗ = 20.
TABLE I: Numerical results on the lower-bounds on λ for
two different horizons in Case I.
Secondly, we assume the rover has a certain probability
to fall off a sand dune located at the bottom of the terrain.
Safety considerations imply that the probability of falling
off the dune should be less than 10%. Such scenarios are
commonly referred to as slippery grid worlds. The problem
for a 4× 4 grid and 2 rocks is depicted in Figure 3.
B. Numerical Results
In our model, we assume the rock at the bottom of the
grid is bad , and the other is good .
1) Case I: The first scenario we consider pertains to a
policy that checks the type of the rocks from the initial
state, then moves to the goal region after having sufficient
confidence about the types of the rock according to a nominal
observation probability. In order to model, the distance
from the the rock positions and limited sensor accuracy,
we assume the probability of having a correct observation
belongs the interval [0.1, 0.2] and we set the nominal obser-
vation probability to 0.2. Given the policy designed for the
nominal observation probability, our goal here is to find a
lower bound on λ satisfying P (rock1 good ∩ rock2 bad) =
bt∗(rock1 good)bt∗(rock2 bad) ≥ λ, which lower-bounds
the probability of identifying the rocks correctly. At the same
time, we want to make sure that the rover does not move to
the three slippery states at the bottom of the grid. We embed
this safety constraint as Pslip = bt∗(slipping state) ≤ 0.1.
To this end, we construct two barrier certificate of fixed
degree using Corollary 2 and perform a line search on the
values of λ.
Table I demonstrates the results and shows that increasing
the degree of the barrier certificates improves the accuracy of
the lower bound. Experiments using PRISM and Storm also
corroborate the consistency of these results. In the worst case
of the uncertain observation probabilities, the nominal policy
achieves the values of P (rock1 good ∩ rock2 bad) = 0.61
at t∗ = 10 and P (rock1 good ∩ rock2 bad) = 0.84 at t∗ =
20. Figures (4.a) and (4.b) show two snapshots of how the
Mars rover moves given this policy: the Mars rover stops
at the initial position and use sensors to collect information
about the rocks and then moves to the goal region.
2) Case II: We set the probability of having a correct
observation to belong to the interval [0.32, 0.42] and the
nominal probability is set to 0.42. The Mars rover is given
a policy such that it first moves closer to the rocks, then
checks the type of the rocks using the sensor, and moves
to the goal after identifying the rock types. Figures (4.c)
and (4.d) show two snapshots of the trajectory of the Mars
rover over the grid using the nominal policy. In this case,
we are interested to find lower bounds on λ1 and λ2
deg(B) 1 2 3
λ1 0.37 0.65 0.84
deg(B) 1 2 3
λ2 0.32 0.73 0.89
TABLE II: Numerical results on the lower-bounds on λ1 and
λ2 in Case II.
(a) t = 10 (b) t = 45
(c) t = 10 (d) t = 20
Fig. 4: Top: Positions of the Mars rover at certain time steps
t with the first policy. Bottom: Positions of the Mars rover
at certain time steps t with the second policy.
satisfying b10(rock1 good) ≥ λ1, b20(rock2 bad) ≥ λ2,
which corresponds to the belief in identifying each individual
rock accurately.
Table II presents the results and demonstrates that in-
creasing the degree of the barrier certificates enhances the
lower bounds. These results tally with experiments in PRISM
and Storm, which show that in the worst case, we have
b10(rock1 good) = 0.92 and b20(rock2 bad) = 0.94.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed an approach for verifying the safety and/or
optimality properties of POMDPs with uncertain transi-
tion/observation probabilities. The transition and/or observa-
tion uncertainties we considered belonged to fixed intervals.
We cast the POMDP analysis problem into a switched system
analysis problem and we brought forward a method based on
barrier certificates. We showed that we can verify the satis-
faction of optimality or safety requirements by computing
a barrier certificate using sum-of-squares programming. We
illustrated the applicability of our method on a Mars rover
exploration example.
In this work, we considered the worst case analysis
with the uncertain transition and/or observation probabilities.
However, this analysis may be too conservative for problems
where certain information about the transition/observation
probabilities in terms of a probability density function
is known. In this regard, the application of the scenario
approach seems relevant [45]. Furthermore, the proposed
method based on barrier certificates for verification of the
POMDPs can also be used to synthesize policies ensuring
both safety and optimality.
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APPENDIX
A. Sum-of-Squares Polynomials
A polynomial p(x) is a sum-of-squares polynomial if
∃pi(x) ∈ R[x], i ∈ {1, . . . , nd} such that p(x) =
∑
i p
2
i (x).
Hence p(x) is clearly non-negative. A set of polynomials
pi is called SOS decomposition of p(x). The converse
does not hold in general, that is, there exist non-negative
polynomials which do not have an SOS decomposition [46].
The computation of SOS decompositions, can be cast as an
SDP (see [46], [47], [48]). The Theorem below proves that,
in sets satisfying a property stronger than compactness, any
positive polynomial can be expressed as a combination of
sum-of-squares polynomials and polynomials describing the
set.
For a set of polynomials g¯ = {g1(x), . . . , gm(x)}, m ∈ N,
the quadratic module generated by m is
M(g¯) :=
{
σ0 +
m∑
i=1
σigi|σi ∈ Σ[x]
}
. (21)
A quadratic module M ∈ R[x] is said archimedean if
∃N ∈ N such that N − |x|2 ∈ M. An archimedian set is
always compact [49]. At this point, we recall the following
result [50, Theorem 2.14].
Theorem 2 (Putinar Positivstellensatz): Suppose the
quadratic module M(g¯) is archimedian. Then for every
f ∈ R[x],
f > 0 ∀ x ∈ {x|g1(x) ≥ 0, . . . , gm(x) ≥ 0} ⇒ f ∈ (g¯).
The subsequent proposition formalizes the problem of
constrained positivity of polynomials which is a direct result
of applying Positivstellensatz.
Proposition 1 ([51]): Let {ai}ki=1 and {bi}li=1 belong to
P , then
p(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn : ai(x) = 0, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., k
and bj(x) ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, 2, ..., l (22)
is satisfied, if the following holds
∃r1, r2, . . . , rk ∈ R[x] and ∃s0, s1, . . . , sl ∈ Σ[x]
p =
∑k
i=1 riai +
∑l
i=1 sibi + s0 (23)
Proposition 2: The multivariable polynomial p(x) is
strictly positive (p(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ Rn), if there exists a λ > 0
such that (
p(x)− λ) ∈ Σ[x]. (24)
